



Abstract—Economic crime (i.e. corporate fraud) has a 
significant impact on business. This study analyzes the fraud cases 
reported by the Malaysian Securities Commission. Frauds involving 
market manipulation and/or illegal share trading are the most 
common types of fraud reported over the 6 years analyzed. The 
highest number of frauds reported involved investment and fund 
holding companies. Alarmingly the results indicate quite a high 
number of frauds cases are committed by management. The higher 
number of Chinese perpetrators may be due to fact that they are the 
dominant group in Malaysian business. The result also shows that 
more than half of companies involved with fraud are privately held 
companies in the investment/fund/finance sector. The results of this 
study highlight general characteristic of perpetrators (person and 
company) that commit fraud which could help the regulators in their 
monitoring and enforcement activities.  To investors, this would help 
in analyzing their business investment or portfolio risk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ECENT statistics regarding economic crime show that 
corporate fraud is one of the most problematic issues for 
businesses around the world. The PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) [1] survey highlights cases related to fraud in Malaysia 
as follows: 
• 3% of respondents reported economic crime for the 
year 2003 and 2004, with 57% related to the 
misappropriation of assets. 
• 70% of the cases are committed by people inside the 
companies, and of these, 21% were committed by 
members of the management team.  
The number of reported cases of economic crime committed 
by company employees in Malaysia is higher than that 
reported for the Asia-Pacific region and for other countries 
around the world. This statistic supports the statement made 
 
Raziah Bi is with the University Technology MARA, Malaysia and 
currently studying her PhD at Lincoln University, Faculty of Commerce, P.O 
Box 84, Lincoln University, 7647, New Zealand (phone: +643-3253838 ext. 
7631; fax: +643-3256847; e-mail: raziahbims@yahoo.com.my).  
Jamal Roudaki (Dr) is with Faculty of Commerce, P.O Box 84, Lincoln 
University, 7647, New Zealand (e-mail:roudakij@lincoln.ac.nz). 
Murray B. Clark is with Lincoln University, Faculty of Commerce, P.O 
Box 84, Lincoln University, 7647, New Zealand (e-mail: 
clarkm@lincoln.ac.nz). 
Norhayati Alias is with the University Technology MARA, Malaysia and 
currently studying her PhD at Lincoln University, Faculty of Commerce, P.O 
Box 84, Lincoln University, 7647, New Zealand (email: 
aliasnorhayati@yahoo.com) 
by the PwC Malaysia’s dispute analysis and investigations 
leader, as cited in the PwC press release1 that senior 
management were driven by the incentive to maintain an 
expensive lifestyle and were unaware that they were 
committing any wrongdoing, and because of their position in 
the company, they have the opportunity to override the 
controls system to detect fraud. Managers are supposed to 
safeguard the assets of the company and to increase 
shareholder wealth. However, it seems that they are increasing 
their own wealth at the expense of the shareholders.  The PwC 
[1] survey also highlighted the following issues: 
• Companies in Malaysia are more vulnerable to 
corruption and bribery, and suffered more from 
corruption and bribery as compared to other countries. 
• The perception held by the Malaysian companies that 
suffered corruption and bribery is that corruption and 
bribery has no or limited impact on the image of the 
company. 
• Malaysian companies are willing to invest in extended 
internal controls and risk management. However, only 
25% are willing to strengthen the internal audit as 
compared to 49% around the world. 
A later survey by PwC [2] indicates that 48% of Malaysian 
companies were the victims of economic crime, which is 
considerably higher than the 23% that was reported in the 
2005 PwC survey. However, the 2007 PwC survey reported a 
decrease in the number of perpetrators among senior and 
middle management but an increase in the number of 
perpetrators from other employees. Further, the PwC [3] 
survey reveals that for the two years prior to the survey, the 
average loss from fraud per company in Malaysia was US 
$173,303. The 2007 PwC survey indicates that corporate 
fraud would also damage the brand name, staff morale, 
external business relations, relations with the regulators, and 
share value. The impact of corporate fraud does not fall on the 
company and shareholders alone as it will have significant 
impact on employment, social stability and public as a whole. 
The most recent PwC survey, PwC [4], shows that 66 % of 
Malaysian companies surveyed reported a decline in financial 
performance, presumably as a result of the  economic 
downturn that had occurred. It was also reported that 82% of 
the respondents indicated they faced increased pressure to 
report better financial performance, although there is a risk 
that this may lead to more fraudulent activity within their 
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companies. Twenty-eight percent of the respondents reported 
that they have experienced economic crime in the last 12 
months before the survey. Even more alarming was that 50% 
of fraudulent activities are detected by ‘accident’, suggesting 
that serendipity rather than management control plays a more 
significant role in fraud detection. These evidences depict that 
fraud or similar economic crimes remain as problematic issues 
in Malaysia. Anwar [5] stated that from the Malaysian 
Securities Commission (MSC) investigations, many of the 
losses suffered by PN4  and PN172 companies were largely 
caused by mismanagement, fraud and other unethical 
practices. PN4 stands for Practice Notes Number 4 and PN17 
stands for Practice Notes Number 17 are the regulations 
issued by Bursa Malaysia Securities in dealing with 
companies that is facing financial difficulties [6, 7]. This 
statement highlights that managers were failing to perform 
their stewardship duties towards the shareholders. Therefore a 
control mechanism is needed to govern the manager’s acts. 
The collapse of several Malaysian companies is partly due to 
the ineffectiveness of the regulatory agencies in their 
legislation enforcement, punishment and protecting minority 
shareholders [8].  
It is not easy, if not impossible, for the public and general 
investors to detect fraud in a company. This group has to 
depend on the regulatory regime to ‘control’ the activities of 
the company.  Since the MSC has the power to enforce the 
provisions of the regulatory regime, a study of corporate fraud 
based on information published by that MSC should provide 
an insight into the incidence of corporate fraud in Malaysia. 
Thus, this paper will use information about fraud cases 
involving companies than have been listed in the Malaysian 
Securities Commission Enforcement Releases. It is anticipated 
that this paper will contribute to the literature relating to 
corporate fraud in Malaysia. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next 
section explains the significance of the study followed by an 
overview of the Malaysian Capital Market Legislation and the 
MSC. This is followed by a discussion on prior studies 
concerning corporate and management fraud, then the 
research methodology and discussion on our findings. The 
final sections conclude the paper and offer suggestions for 
future research. 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
As mentioned above, corporate fraud has a negative impact 
on the company’s brand(s), staff morale, external business 
relations, relations with regulators, and the value of the 
company’s shares. It can be fairly said that corporate fraud 
impacts on the company, its shareholders, and society at large 
by way of employment and social stability. Often the parties 
that lose the most as a result of fraud are the minority 
 
2 PN4 and PN17 are conditions where companies are facing financial 
difficulty (i.e. in distress) and did not meet the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
requirements. These companies are also known as financially distressed 
companies. Companies listed in the above two practice notes will be 
suspended from Bursa trading and required to improve their financial situation 
before the suspension would be lifted.  
shareholders and individual investors. The need for a more 
effective way to regulate, enforce, detect and prevent fraud 
has increased since one cannot rely upon accidental detection 
to combat such fraud. The regulators have to be more vigilant 
and effective in their efforts to fight corporate fraud. The aims 
of this paper are to review the role of market regulators in 
Malaysia, in particular the MSC, and to analyse the fraud 
cases published on the MSC website (the MSC Enforcement 
Releases).  
III.  MALAYSIAN CAPITAL MARKET AND 
LEGISLATION 
The Malaysian capital market is very much concentrated on 
family-owned businesses. Studies conducted by Lim [9] and 
Zhuang, Edwards and Capulong [10] indicate that large 
holdings of common stocks are family owned. Often, the 
managers are members of the family that owns a large 
percentage of shares in these companies. Given this 
relationship, it is reasonable to suggest that the manager 
would endeavour to increase the value of the company since 
this ultimately increases the wealth of the family. On the other 
hand, there is an issue of insider trading, whereby the manager 
has an intimate knowledge of the business and is in a position 
to use that information for personal gain before that 
information becomes publicly available. In cases where the 
company has performed poorly or is in financial distress, these 
insiders can sell their shares before the company collapses, 
thereby avoiding or minimising personal loss whereas the 
minority shareholders who lack this inside knowledge will not 
have the same opportunity to avoid such loss. Therefore it is 
suggested that legislation relating to capital markets and 
corporate governance should protect the interests of all 
shareholders, especially minority interests. [11]. 
 The Malaysian corporate sector has grown rapidly since the 
1990s. The total market capitalisation of listed companies on 
the main and second boards of the Malaysian stock exchange 
(Bursa Malaysia Berhad) has grown by an average of 40% per 
year throughout this period [12]. In the same years the number 
of listed companies has been steadily increasing. It is therefore 
suggested that a proper regulatory and legislative regime is 
needed to govern this capital market. Currently, the Malaysian 
capital market is governed by the following Acts of 
Parliament: 
•  Capital Market and Services Act 2007 
• Securities Industry (Central Depositories Act) 1991 
• Securities Commission Act 1993 
• Companies Act 1965 
• Offshore Companies Act 1990 
• Labuan Offshore Securities Industry Act 1995 
Figure 1 shows the regulatory framework of the Malaysian 
Capital Market. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
controlling the market which is actively represented by the 
Securities Commission (MSC) and Labuan Offshore Financial 




Services Authority (LOFSA)3. The Securities Commission 
governs the Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad, formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange or KLSE), as well as being responsible for the 
enforcement of the capital market rules and regulations. 
Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority is responsible 
for governing the Labuan International Financial Exchange 
only.  
 
Source: Bursa Malaysia, 2009  
Fig.1 The regulatory framework of Malaysian Capital Market 
The two main agencies that regulate the Malaysian capital 
market are therefore the MSC and Bursa Malaysia Berhad. 
The MSC is a self-funding statutory body with investigative 
and enforcement powers that has an important role to play 
with respect to corporate fraud, since it has the power to 
prosecute companies for committing fraudulent acts. This 
authority will be explained in more detail in the next section, 
but briefly, the MSC administers the following Acts:  
• Securities Commission Act 1993;  
• Capital Markets and Services Act 2007; and  
• Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991. 
Bursa Malaysia is the main Malaysian stock exchange 
organization. It was established in 1973 to provide a central 
market place for Malaysian listed companies to transact 
business in shares, bonds and various other securities. This 
 
3 Labuan is an island strategically located in the Asia-Pacific region, off the 
coast of East Malaysia. It is administered by the Federal Government of 
Malaysia. Labuan Offshore Financial Services is an integrated International 
Business & Financial Centre (IBFC), offering a wide range of offshore 
financial product and services to customers worldwide including banking and 
investment banking, insurance, captives, trust business, fund management, 
investment holding, company management and Islamic Financing. Labuan, 
Malaysia, was designated as an offshore international financial centre in 1990. 
As part of its development, an offshore financial exchange, Labuan 
International Financial Exchange (LIFX), was launched on 23 November 
2000. 
 
self regulated organization governs the conduct of its 
members. Bursa Malaysia has its own listing and disclosure 
standards that must be followed by listed companies [13]. 
Bursa Malaysia, in its effort to ensure that listed companies 
maintain these standards and abide by their regulations, 
established Practice Notes for distressed companies (i.e. 
companies in financial distress). This is to monitor the 
companies and maintain the quality of market place. Apart 
from the MSC and Bursa Malaysia, the following regulatory 
bodies have responsibilities relating to company and business 
activities in Malaysia. Each has their own duty to ensure the 
smoothness of the market as well the protection of the 
interests of shareholders, irrespective of whether they are 
majority interest or minority interests. The bodies that are 
responsible for regulating and governing the capital market 
and company disclosure and reporting requirements are: 
• Bank Negara Malaysia (the Malaysian Central Bank) – 
responsible for governing the banking and finance 
industries.  
• Company Commission of Malaysia (CCM) – 
responsible for the management and enforcement of the 
Companies Act 1965 (Act 125), Business Registration 
Act (Act 197), Companies Trust Act (Act 100), and 
any other subsidiary law under any of the above 
mentioned acts such as the Companies Regulations 
1966 and Business Registration 1957. The Company 
Commission of Malaysia works with other regulatory 
bodies and authorities such as the Insolvency 
Department of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia, 
Securities Commission of Malaysia and related 
government agencies, to ensure that good corporate 
governance is practiced by the market players. 
• Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) - an 
independent technical body responsible for setting the 
Malaysian accounting standards. Its primary objectives 
are the setting of accounting standards and conceptual 
framework.  
• Malaysia Royal Police (Commercial Crime 
Department) - the main function of this department is 
to investigate, catch and prosecute white collar 
criminals who commit fraud or corruption, including 
commercial falsification and cyber crime. The 
Commercial Crime Department consists of units such 
as the anti-laundering unit, forensic accounting unit, 
financial investigation unit, corporate investigation 
unit, multimedia and cyber investigation unit, and other 
units for forgery including credit card forgery. This 
Department and the Malaysian Securities Commission 
both play an effective role in combating fraud. 
IV. MALAYSIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION 
The Malaysian Securities Commission (MSC) was 
established on first of March 1993 under the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. It is a self-funding statutory body with 
investigative and enforcement powers that reports to the 




Minister of Finance. It is required to table its accounts 
annually in Parliament. According to the MSC (2009) website 
the Commission's regulatory functions include:  
• Supervising exchanges, clearing houses and central 
depositories;  
• Registering authority for prospectuses of corporations 
other than unlisted recreational clubs;  
• Approving authority for corporate bond issues;  
• Regulating all matters relating to securities and futures 
contracts;  
• Regulating the take-over and mergers of companies  
• Regulating all matters relating to unit trust schemes;  
• Licensing and supervising all licensed persons;  
• Encouraging self-regulation; and  
• Ensuring proper conduct of market institutions and 
licensed persons.  
The MSC ultimate responsibility is to protect investors.  
Apart from discharging its regulatory functions, the 
Commission is also obliged by statute to encourage and 
promote the development of the securities and futures markets 
in Malaysia. It has direct responsibility to supervise and 
monitor the activities of market institutions and regulate all 
persons licensed under the Capital Markets and Services Act 
2007. The MSC enforcement and legislation is divided into 
four sections: 
• Criminal Prosecution 
• Civil Actions 
• Administrative Actions 
• Cases Compounded 
Criminal prosecution and civil actions will be those cases 
that the MSC bring forward to court while the administrative 
actions will be the warning, revamp or licence been revoked 
by the MSC. Cases compounded are those cases with less 
serious offences where the MSC will offer certain amount of 
compounds (penalties in monetary terms) and warning letter. 
The MSC will make public announcements on all cases been 
investigated through a press release and enforcement release 
listings. This study uses the MSC Enforcement Releases as 
primary source of data. Analysis of the cases, its natures, 
penalties and outcomes from the year 2002 to 2007 therefore 
extract the following results. The penalties resulting from 
criminal prosecutions varied from fines of RM 30,000 to RM 
3 million and jail sentences that varied from one day to five 
years. However, it should be noted that many of the cases 
reported are still subject to court proceedings or are under 
appeal. For civil actions, outcomes varied from the imposition 
of a restraining order, restoring defendant assets to restitution 
depending on the severity and type of offences committed. 
The penalties for administrative actions range from a warning 
letter, the revocation of a licence, a public reprimand, and the 
‘correction’ and reissue of affected financial statements. For 
compounded cases from 2002 to 2007 the amount of 
compound varies from RM 10,000 to RM 1 million. 
The MSC plays the most important role in dealing with 
corporate fraud. It has the investigative and enforcement 
powers over publicly traded companies irrespective of 
whether or not they are listed by Bursa Malaysia. The MSC 
also has the power to charge a company with criminal fraud. 
This study will explain the role of MSC and analyze the data 
on corporate fraud published in its Enforcement Release 
section. 
V. BUSINESS RISK AND FRAUD 
The ultimate goal of an investor is to receive a return on 
their investment that is appropriate for the level of risk 
associated with that investment. It is generally accepted that 
there is a positive correlation between risk and return. It is 
therefore vital that investors and shareholders are provided 
with information that helps them assess the risks associated 
with any particular business. This is no easy task since risk is 
a function of many factors, including those that relate to the 
socio-economic environment within which the business 
operates. However, it has been suggested that risk can be 
categorised in three ways [14]: 
• Inherent Industry Risk – Inherent risk is the risk that is 
impossible to manage or transfer away for a particular 
industry. There are two types of fraud associated with 
inherent industry risk, namely management fraud and 
employee fraud, both of which could occur in any type 
of business. The risk of management fraud is 
influenced by a few key characteristics such as 
financial structure, the company’s secrecy policy, and 
volume of transactions, access to credit, where there 
are new and complex products, and where the market is 
subject to changing conditions.  The risk of employee 
fraud is greater when authority to deal with large 
transactions is given to lower level management 
without the existence of proper controls.  
• Environmental Risk – This risk relates to the 
organization or business structure, the social and 
cultural environment, performance evaluation, 
financial condition and managerial structure and 
quality. 
• Business Risk – The risk associated with the market 
and customer. 
Financial statements are one of the important sources of 
information used by shareholders, investors and other 
stakeholders in assessing company’s performance. Financial 
statements should be free from bias, material errors, or 
misstatements. Misstatement is a result of fraud or 
unintentional errors of a material nature. Auditing Standards 
SAS No. 54, AICPA 1988 (SAS No. 82), AICPA 1997 define 
fraudulent financial reporting as “fraudulent acts that cause 
material misstatement of financial statement”. Therefore, 
fraud can be classified into 1) Misstatements arising from 




fraudulent financial reporting and 2) the misappropriation of 
assets. Nonetheless, KPMG [15] has a broader view that 
breaks financial fraud into five categories: 
• Fraudulent Financial Statement reporting – most 
fraudulent financial reporting schemes involve 
earnings management, arising from improper revenue 
recognition and overstatement of assets or 
understatement of liabilities. 
• Misappropriation of assets – this category involves 
external and internal schemes such as embezzlement, 
payroll fraud, external theft, procurement fraud, royalty 
fraud and counterfeiting. 
• Expenditures and liabilities (avoided or incurred) for 
improper purposes – this category refers to commercial 
and public bribery, tax fraud, wages abuse, falsifying 
compliance data provided by regulators, as well as 
other improper payment schemes,  
• Fraudulently obtained revenue and assets– such as over 
billing customers, deceptive sales practices, accelerated 
revenue or bogus revenue. 
• Other misconduct – such as conflicts of interest, insider 
trading, discrimination, theft of competitor trade 
secrets, antitrust practices and environmental 
violations. 
VI. PRIOR STUDIES 
This section reviews past research studies in corporate 
fraud.  This section will start with a brief discussion on fraud 
motivation, the element of fraud and causes that triggers fraud 
to happen. It is then followed by a brief review on agency cost 
and management fraud.  
Beasely, Carcello and Hermanson [16] indicate that fraud is 
committed in more than one way and revenues and 
misstatement are the common techniques used. Squires [17] 
states that economic crime and fraud does not show a clear or 
obvious signal and therefore forensic accountants have to look 
beyond all the figures to see the reality. There are three 
elements that are common to all fraudulent acts; a perceived 
pressure, a perceived opportunity, and ability to rationalize the 
fraud as acceptable and consistent with one’s personal ethics 
[see 1, 14, 18]. The motivation to commit fraud is due to 
pressure, such as financial needs, frustration with work, or the 
challenge to ‘beat the system’. The opportunity to commit 
fraud is enhanced when the internal control system is weak or 
absent. The final element is the ability of the (potential) 
perpetrator to rationalise their behaviour as acceptable.  
According to the PwC (2007) survey, there are two types of 
‘causes’ that could trigger fraud, namely, individual causes 
and corporate causes. Individual causes are the perpetrator’s 
personal reasons for committing fraud encompassing the 
incentive to commit a fraudulent act and the ability to 
rationalise their actions to themselves. Corporate causes are 
the organizational reasons that allowed fraud to occur. The 
survey lists the following reasons why fraudulent acts had 
been committed: 
i. Individual causes – Financial incentives (greed), low 
temptation threshold, lack of awareness of wrongdoing, 
expensive lifestyle, denial to financial consequences, 
career disappointment and potential redundancy. 
ii. Corporate causes – Low commitment to brand, 
insufficient controls within the organisation, the use of 
authority to override existing controls, high level of  
staff anonymity, high target for company performance, 
and lack of clarity concerning corporate ethics.  
According to agency theory, unconstrained management 
will act in a manner that benefits themselves at the expense of 
the owners, although this agency problem can be addressed by 
monitoring and control activities [19]. Jensen and Meckling 
[20], Rozeff [21] and Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera and Raymond 
[22] indicate that dividend payment reduces the agency 
problem as it reduces the discretionary funds available to 
managers. Rozeff (1982) states that in firms where insiders 
hold a lower fraction of the equity and/or a greater number of 
stockholders own the outside equity, the dividend payout 
would be higher as dividend payments are part of the firm’s 
monitoring strategy that could reduce the agency cost. In order 
to control agency cost from inefficiencies, managers will 
make financial policy tradeoffs (Crutchley et al. 1999).  
Nonetheless, shareholders have to incur these agency costs 
in order to reduce the agency problems. Allowing managers 
excessive levels of freedom enables them to act in their own 
interest, increases the likelihood that fraudulent acts might be 
committed. According to Zahra, Priem and Rasheed [23], 
fraudulent acts are deliberate acts of management (at any 
level) that are designed to deceive, con, swindle or cheat 
stakeholders. Managerial fraud would refer to any such 
actions taken by top management, that is, senior management 
who have the authority to make decisions on behalf of the 
company. Some decisions made by the managers did not take 
into consideration the sustainability of the company in the 
future; it is made based on the benefit that the managers would 
receive. For example, during the economic boom, managers 
decided to commit the companies into large debts to finance 
many projects. This resulted in company’s performance being 
at the top. However, when the economic started to decline, the 
company will face the problem of paying up debts, thus 
moved into a difficult situation. 
Brief, Dukerich, Brown and Brett [24] conducted a study on 
chief financial officers and the pressure to shift expenses 
between periods for income smoothing and found out that 
87% of the respondents are willing to do so. Barnes [25] states 
that senior managers and directors will take all possible action 
to improve company’s performance as a defence against a 
potential merger or takeover as their livelihoods are at stake. 
The same conclusions were made from the studies conducted 
by Jensen [26] and Franks and Mayer [27]. Williamson [28] 
argues that the motivations for managers principally include 
salary, security prestige and power which may be seen 
through expense account, luxurious office, company cars, the 
number of assistants, professional excellence and others. A 
study conducted by McKenna [29] and Brief et al. [24] shows 
the same conclusion that managers are willing to smooth 




income or misrepresent accounting information when under 
pressure. The collapse of many multinational companies such 
as Enron, WorldCom, and others, resulted from fraudulent 
acts being committed by management in order to report good 
corporate performance even though the reality was the 
opposite. 
VII. RESEARCH METHODLOGY 
This study analyzes the Malaysian Securities Commission 
Enforcement Releases for period 2002 to 2007. The data 
related to company or persons being charged and 
investigated for commercial fraud is obtained from the MSC 
website under the enforcement section. Analysis of data is 
carried out on the four sections of enforcement release 
documents namely the criminal prosecution, civil actions, 
administrative actions, and cases compounded. Descriptive 
statistics for each section are prepared, as follows:  
• Number of cases in section for 2002 to 2007 – this 
analysis is based on the number of cases reported in 
each category (criminal prosecution, civil action, 
administrative action and cases compounded) 
• The nature or type of offences – for this analysis, the 
offences nature for each of the cases reported will be 
categorized in the accounting and auditing natures 
(AA) or other (O) natures such as breach of client trust, 
unlicensed trading or share price manipulation. 
• The perpetrators – this analysis is on the characteristic 
of perpetrators that is the person/people that commit 
the fraud. The two characteristic analyzed are the 
ethnicity and whether they belong to management 
groups or employee/non-employee group. 
• A general characteristic of fraudulent company – the 
general characteristic that is analyzed is the type of the 
company and in what industry does each of the 
company trade in. 
VIII. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
This section discusses the results of analysis on the MSC 
Enforcement Releases from 2002 to 2007. Investigation into 
company misconduct or mismanagement is initiated from 
public or employee (whistleblowers) ‘complaints’ and/or from 
any observed irregularities in company activities that were 
detected by the MSC as a result of their monitoring activities. 
The results of descriptive analysis are presented here in four 
sections of number of fraud cases, nature of offences, the 
perpetrators/fraudsters, and general characteristic of 
fraudulent companies.  
A. Number of Fraud Cases 
Table 1 shows the number of cases published in MSC 
Enforcement Releases from 2002 to 2007. It should be noted 
that this table does not report the number of persons or entities 
charged for each case. The highest number of cases for 
criminal prosecutions is fifteen which was reported in 2002 
and the lowest was four cases in 2004. Except for 2004, 
criminal prosecution cases were the highest type of 
enforcement action taken. Civil action cases are the lowest for 
all the years analyzed, with zero reported cases for 2002 to 
2004.  
TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CASES IN EACH CLASS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
Administrative action cases are the second lowest number 
reported for the six years of study. The highest were nine 
cases reported in 2002 and four in 2003 and 2005 and one 
cases in 2006 and two cases in 2004 and 2007. The number of 
compounded cases reported ranged from six to seven in 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005. The number decrease to 4 cases in 2006 
and down to three cases in 2007. Overall, 2002 shows the 
highest number of reported cases and 2004 shows the lowest. 
There is a decreasing trend from 2002 to 2004 and an 
increasing trend from 2005 to 2007. Two possible reasons for 
the decreasing trend are more effective internal controls 
within companies and effectiveness in enforcement by the 
regulators. One possible reason for the increasing number of 
cases after 2004 is the ability of the perpetrators to override 
the control systems.   
The fluctuation of the number of cases spread throughout 
the six years is shown clearly by the line chart in Figure 2. 
 










2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Y ear
Criminal prosecut ions Civil Act ions 
Administ rat ive Act ions Cases Compounded
 
  Fig. 2 Number of cases in each class of enforcement 
The PwC (2007) survey indicates that 48% of companies 
surveyed were subjected to fraud for 2005 and 2006. Since 
100 Malaysian public listed companies responded to this 
Enforcement 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Criminal prosecutions 15 13 4 8 6 8 
Civil Actions  - - - 1 1 4 
Administrative Actions 9 4 2 4 1 2 
Cases Compounded 7 6 7 6 4 3 
Total 31 23 13 19 12 17 




survey, it follows that 48 of these companies were the subject 
of fraudulent acts during this period. However, for the same 
period of time, the MSC reported only 31 companies from a 
population of all public and private companies in Malaysia. 
This apparent difference suggests that many cases of fraud are 
either not detected or not reported to the MSC.  Since 
perpetrators always attempt to cover-up their fraudulent acts, 
detection is not easy and this may be one reason why it is 
difficult to determine the actual number of fraud cases. 
Another reason may be that the company is reluctant to report 
fraud for fear that the company’s image may be tarnished. 
Irrespective of the reason, this discrepancy should be of 
concern to the relevant authorities who, perhaps, need to be 
more active in monitoring and enforcement. 
B. Nature of Offences 
Table 2 illustrates the nature of offences from 2002 to 2007, 
divided into two categories of accounting and auditing related 
offences and other offences. The accounting and auditing 
related offences are those that violate the accounting and 
auditing requirements in terms of reporting and disclosure 
such as providing or furnishing misleading financial statement 
which contains material omission and incorrect figure (assets 
and revenue were inflated or deflated).  Other offences are the 
offences committed that are not related to accounting and 
auditing requirement violation such as unlicensed trading, 
unlicensed investment advice, criminal breach of trust, 
unauthorized trading of shares, manipulation of share price 
and unauthorized and unlicensed fund collection. 
According to table 2, in 2007 the number of accounting and 
auditing offences were higher than other offences, and from 
previous years. Although each offence will have an impact on 
the business, it is suggested that accounting and auditing 
offences are likely to have the greater impact since these will 
affect all stakeholders and public trust. Investors and external 
users of the financial statements rely upon audited accounting 
information, so the impact of these types of offence is likely to 
be damaging to these groups. In comparison other offences, 
such as unlicensed trading of shares, unlicensed fund 
collection and unlicensed investment advisor, would be less 
damaging.  
 
TABLE II NATURE OF OFFENCES – 2002-2007 
Legend:  AA – Accounting and Auditing related offences  
       O – Other offences 
 
C. The Perpetrators/fraudsters 
Table 3 represents the data on the groups of perpetrators. 
This study divides the perpetrators into two groups; the 
management team and others. Management team are those 
perpetrators from the middle and senior manager’s level such 
as the chief executive officer, chief financial officer including 
company’s board of directors. Others are perpetrators that did 
not belong to the management team criteria such as general 
employees and outsiders (not company’s employee). 
TABLE 3: FRAUD COMMITTED BY GROUPS OF PERPETRATORS 
FROM 2002 TO 2007 
Group 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Management team 7 13 7 9 6 8 
Others 24 10 6 10 6 9 
Total 31 23 13 19 12 17 
 
Table 3 shows that fraud committed by members of the 
management team is higher in 2003, 2005 and 2007, than in 
2002, 2004 and 2006, but that the number fluctuated over the 
period of the study.  In 2002, 7 out of 31 cases are perpetrated 
by management and increased to 13 cases in 2003. However 
2004 and 2006 show a decrease in number of fraud cases 
perpetrated by management team. 2007 does not shows 
significant decrease in the number of perpetrators from 
management team. On average for the six years analyzed, the 
perpetrator from management team is more than 8 cases per 
year.  
Fraud committed by management is difficult to detect. 
Management have the authority and the opportunity to cover 
fraud and not report it (PwC, 2007). However companies are 
more open in reporting fraud committed by outsiders. The fact 
that fraud is committed by an insider conveys the perception 
that the company has failed to detect and/or deter the 
fraudulent activity, and this will have a negative impact on the 
corporate image.  
 
Offences/Year 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AA O AA O AA O AA O AA O AA O 
Criminal Actions 4 11 3 9 2 2 2 6 3 3 5 3 
Civil Actions - - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 2 
Administrative 
Actions 
1 8 1 4 - 2 1 3 - 1 2 2 
Cases 
Compounded 
4 3 4 2 3 4 1 5 3 1 1 2 
Total 9 22 8 15 5 8 5 14 6 6 10 7 





However, this does not happen when the company reports 
fraud by an outsider since this proclaims ‘success’. Therefore, 
the regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders have to 
closely monitor company performance and managers’ 
activities to ensure a proper conduct and regulations are 
appropriately followed. 
Table 4 shows the results of fraud committed according to 
the ethnic of the perpetrators from 2002 to 2007. For this part 
of analysis the number of perpetrators is based on the number 
of people/person involved in each of the cases therefore the 
number of perpetrators will not be same with the number of 
cases reported as one cases may involved more than one 
person. Malaysia is a multiracial country and the three main 
ethnic groups are Malay, Chinese and Indian. Other group in 
this analysis is the foreigners (not a Malaysian citizen). The 
results of the analysis are shown separately in table 4. In 2002 
the number of Malay perpetrators is the highest followed by 
Chinese with only one Indian. During 2003 to 2007 however, 
most frauds were committed by Chinese. This may be due to 
the fact that in Malaysia, Chinese people are more involved in 
business (as owners or managers) and Chinese people appear 
to have greater interest in businesses as compared to the 
Malays and Indians. Of the 176 perpetrators over the six years 
(a total from 2002 to 2007), 7 are foreigners (i.e. not a 
Malaysian citizen). 
TABLE IV ETHNICITY OF PERPETRATORS 2002-2007 
 
D. General Characteristics of Fraudulent Companies 
The general characteristics of fraudulent companies from 
2002 to 2007 are being presented in table five. 
TABLE V  INDUSTRY AND TYPE OF FRAUDULENT COMPANIES 
 
 
The general characteristics are being determined by 
analyzing industry/sector and type of the fraudulent 
companies. The industry or sector of each company is 
determined by the core or nature of company’s business 
activities. For the six years analysis the industry/sector is 
divided into 10 groups as shown in table five. For this 
analysis, once again the number of companies involved may 
differ from the number of cases recorded this is due to there 
are a few cases where the perpetrators is a person that does not 
represent any companies or commit any crime for a company. 
The type of company is determined by the registration of 
company under Company Act 1965 whether it is a public, 
public listed or private company. Any company that is 
registered under the Companies Act 1965 and has criteria 
defined under Companies Act 1965 Para 15 (1) as in 
Appendix 1 will falls under the private company. A public 
company is a company other than a private company. Public 
listed companies are companies whose shares are listed 
(traded) on Bursa Malaysia, whereas ‘other’ public companies 
are not. Table 5 present the summary of the analysis of 10 
industry types of fraudulent companies. 
Table 5 shows the attributes of the companies listed in the 
Enforcement Release for various charges of fraud and 
misconduct. The analysis shows the majority of companies 
charged with frauds are private companies that are 44 out of 
88 companies. Private companies are not subject to mandatory 
requirements for corporate governance and are under less 
scrutiny by the public and regulators. Consequently, their 
internal management control could be weak that fraudulent 
activities could easily been committed. Three of the public 
listed companies charged with fraud are listed as PN4/PN17 
companies, which indicate that they are in financial distress.  
The PwC (2009) economic crime survey indicates that 
companies facing financial difficulty with higher performance 
pressure are vulnerable to fraud. The highest proportion of 
offenders, 50 companies out of a total of 88 companies 
reported, came from the Investment holdings/fund 
management/ finance sector or industry.  
 
 
Ethnicity 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Malay 25 9 2 6 4 5 51 
Chinese 23 18 12 19 17 26 115 
Indian 1 2 - - - - 3 
Others - 2 2 2 1 - 7 









Total Listed Not Listed 
Manufacturing/Industrial product 7 1 - - 8
Construction & Engineering 3 - - - 3
Investment Holding/ Fund 1 4 42 3 50
Technology/ Telecommunication 2 2 - - 4
Property development 3 - - - 3
Plantation 1 - - - 1
Consumer product 3 2 - - 5
Trading & Services 4 2 2 - 8
PN4/ PN17 3 - - - 3
Others (accounting firm, valuer) - - - 3 3
Total 27 11 44 6 88




Most of the investment/fund/finance company committed 
fraud in dealing with client monies, initial public offerings, 
manipulation of share price and unauthorized dealing in 
securities. These types of fraudulent activities will diminish 
the public trust in the capital market investment which will 
affect the economic development. Three companies being 
charged with fraud are foreign investment companies and one 
is an accounting firm and two are valuer companies. From the 
total offenders, 38 (27+11) of the companies are public 
companies from which public listed companies are more than 
half of it. It is quite a high number (27) of public listed 
companies involved in fraud and the impact could be very 
damaging to the minority interest group and individual 
investors due to the concentrated family-owned businesses in 
Malaysia.  
IX. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS 
This study reveals the number of corporate frauds reported 
from 2002 to 2007 which are categorised by nature of fraud, 
perpetrators (management and others), ethnicity, industry and 
type of the companies. The high percentage of fraud 
committed by management shows that fraud is a serious threat 
to businesses specifically to the investors in Malaysia. The 
Malaysian Chinese community is the lead player in Malaysian 
business which could contribute to the results that they 
illustrate a higher number of perpetrators of fraudulent acts. 
Private companies constitute the majority offenders for the six 
years with the investment/fund/finance sector presenting a 
higher number of fraud cases. This could be due to the fact 
that the private companies are subject to less scrutiny by the 
public and regulators or the enforcement agencies. Private 
companies are not subject to the mandatory requirement to 
have corporate governance which could be another reason for 
the high number of private company involved with fraudulent 
activities. As public companies are more exposed to public 
scrutiny and subject to greater regulation, the incidence of 
reported fraud was quite low. It is suggested that private 
companies should be effectively monitored since they 
constitute more than half of the total number of fraud cases 
that were reported. 
However, since a vast majority of fraud cases are detected 
accidentally or through whistleblower, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that there must be more cases of fraud that are not 
being detected and/or reported to the authorities or regulators. 
It is therefore very important for the regulators to be 
increasingly vigilant in their detection activities and to have 
effective regulations in order to protect the interest of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Companies have to be 
more open to reporting acts of fraud and to take corrective 
action/s. The limitation of this study is its descriptive nature, 
relies upon the information published in the Malaysian 
Securities Enforcement Releases. Future research could be 
carried out in analyzing the nature of offences and the 
penalties to understand the punishment system and its impact 
on the fraudulent activities. A study on the time taken in 
dealing with each fraud cases could also be carried in 
understanding the effectiveness of fraud enforcement in 
Malaysia. 
APPENDIX 
1. The criteria of private companies defined under Companies 
Act 1965   Para 15 (1) 
A company having a share capital may be incorporated as 
a private company if its memorandum or articles - 
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares; 
(b) Limits to not more than fifty the number of its 
members (counting joint holders of shares as one 
person and not counting any person in the employment 
of the company or of its subsidiary or any person who 
while previously 58 Laws of Malaysia ACT 125 in the 
employment of the company or of its subsidiary was 
and thereafter has continued to be a member of the 
company); 
(c) Prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe 
for any shares in or debentures of the company; and 
(d) Prohibits any invitation to the public to deposit 
money with the company for fixed periods or payable 
at call, whether bearing or not bearing interest. 
[30] 
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